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3.	Moral	anthropology	and	apriori	enunciations,	Kirsten	Bell	Professor,	University	of	Roehampton	
 Numerous	commentators	have	pointed	to	an	ethical	turn	in	anthropology	since	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century,	which	has	seen	the	emergence	of	an	approach	focused	on	questions	of	morality	and	ethics.		Under	the	rubric	of	‘the	anthropology	of	ethics’	(Faubion	2011,	Laidlaw	2014)	and	‘moral	anthropology’	(Fassin	2008,	2012),i	it	has	been	described	as	“one	of	the	fastest-growing	fields	within	the	discipline”	(Fassin	2014:	430).		At	first	glance,	the	ethical	turn	seems	merely	to	call	for	an	expansion	of	the	anthropological	gaze	to	include	a	new	set	of	concerns:	the	‘ethnography	of	moralities’,	to	use	Signe	Howell’s	(1997)	older	term.		But	closer	inspection	reveals	a	strikingly	ambitious	project—one	that	essentially	calls	for	a	wholesale	re-visioning	of	anthropology.		For	this	reason,	it	is	deserving	of	sustained	scrutiny.		In	principle,	I	have	no	problem	with	anthropologists	turning	their	gaze	towards	the	study	of	morals	and	“how	moral	questions	are	posed	and	addressed	or,	symmetrically,	how	nonmoral	questions	are	rephrased	as	moral”	(Fassin	2008:	4).		Nor	do	I	disagree	that	morals	should	be	a	legitimate	object	for	social	anthropology	in	much	the	same	way	that	politics	or	medicine	is,	although	I	think	that	‘morals’	are	objects	of	a	fundamentally	different	order	than	either	of	these	examples—and	not	just	because	of	the	normative	connotations	of	the	term	‘moral’	itself.			There	are	dangers	here,	ones	that	relate	to	the	question	of	what	is	meant	by	‘morals’	and	‘ethics’;	this	is	something	glossed	over	in	many	accounts.		For	example,	Didier	Fassin	explicitly	avoids	defining	these	terms,	justifying	this	via	recourse	to	the	lack	of	philosophical	agreement	on	their	meaning	and	“because	for	social	scientists	there	is	a	benefit	from	proceeding	in	this	inductive	way”	(Fassin	2012:	6).		But	‘morals’,	‘morality’	and	‘ethics’	are	loose	and	encompassing	concepts.		Especially	when	used	as	synonyms	for	‘values’—which	they	generally	seem	to	be	by	those	who	have	piloted	the	ethical	turn—they	are	“far	too	broad,	far	too	promiscuous”	(Edel	and	Edel	in	Howell	1997:	2);	potentially	anything	and	everything	is	within	their	ambit.			This	encompassing	scope	is	something	proponents	themselves	occasionally	highlight.		For	example,	James	Laidlaw	argues	that	the	anthropology	of	ethics	shouldn’t	be	thought	of	as	a	new	specialism:	“Instead,	its	mission	should	be	an	enrichment	of	the	core	conceptual	vocabulary	and	practice	of	anthropology,	and	its	proper	place	an	integral	dimension	of	the	anthropological	enterprise	as	such.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	ethical	considerations	pervade	all	spheres	of	human	life”	(2014:	1-2).	Indeed,	the	anthropology	of	ethics	is	presented	both	as	something	new	and	simultaneously	what	we	have	always	done.		To	quote	Laidlaw	again:	
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I	have	said	that	the	anthropology	of	ethics	has	developed	largely	within	the	last	couple	of	decades,	and	in	the	relevant	sense	this	is	true….	But	it	is	also	and	equally	importantly	true	that	morality	has	never	been	absent	from	anthropological	thought.		Many	of	the	greatest	ethnographies	written	throughout	the	discipline’s	history	have	at	their	heart	sophisticated	discussions	of	moral	concepts	and	reasoning	(Laidlaw	2014:	10).		He	goes	on	to	produce	a	strikingly	presentist	account	in	which	various	classic	ethnographies	are	reclaimed	as	examples	of	the	anthropology	of	ethics—among	them	E.E.	Evans-Pritchard’s	Witchcraft,	Oracles,	and	Magic	Among	the	Azande.				There	is	little	question	that	Evans-Pritchard	saw	notions	of	witchcraft	as	morally	invested;	in	his	words,	“It	is	in	the	idiom	of	witchcraft	that	Azande	express	moral	rules	which	mostly	lie	outside	of	criminal	and	civil	law”	(Evans-Pritchard	1976:	51).		But	what	happens	when	an	ethnography	whose	primary	significance	resides	in	the	ways	it	“opens	up	new	horizons	of	understanding	that	are	embedded	in	magical	practices”	(Kapferer	2002:	3)	is	reduced	to	a	discussion	of	local	conceptions	of	the	person	and	prevalent	moral	values?		I	would	argue	that	prefiguring	‘the	moral’	in	this	way	serves	to	transform	the	phenomenon	in	question:	reducing	it	to	terms	external	to	it	and	foreclosing	other	equally	important	‘horizons	of	understanding’	that	magical	beliefs	and	practices	speak	to.		In	fact,	this	danger	is	something	alluded	to—albeit	unwittingly—by	Laidlaw	(2014:	2)	himself,	who	points	to	the	study	of	gender	as	a	precedent	for	the	anthropology	of	ethics,	noting	that	what	started	out	as	a	sub-discipline	of	anthropology	(feminist	anthropology)	ultimately	became	a	pervasive	modification	of	the	field	as	a	whole.		I	suspect	the	analogy	is	more	accurate	than	he	intends	because	the	past	quarter	century	has	made	the	“totalizing	gestures	of	feminism”	(Butler	1990:	18)	starkly	apparent—not	only	in	relation	to	the	binary	of	sex/gender	it	was	founded	upon,	but	in	terms	of	the	ways	that	‘gender’	has	been	prefigured	at	the	expense	of	everything	else	(e.g.,	class,	culture,	race,	religion).	Thus,	if	anything,	the	comparison	illustrates	the	need	to	proceed	cautiously.		This	brings	me	to	the	second	premise	of	the	ethical	turn,	which	makes	a	series	of	claims	not	only	about	what	we	should	study	but	how	we	should	study	it.		It’s	in	relation	to	the	latter	topic	that	the	extent	of	the	ambition	to	reshape	anthropology	becomes	apparent.		Although	a	preoccupation	for	all	those	involved	in	the	field,	it	arguably	reaches	its	clearest	articulation	in	Didier	Fassin’s	(2008,	2012)	work.		As	Carlo	Caduff	(2011)	notes,	Fassin	essentially	proposes	a	means	of	bringing	together	the	anthropology	of	ethics	and	the	ethics	of	anthropology;	indeed,	this	is	precisely	why	Fassin	prefers	the	term	‘moral	anthropology’.		This	term,	he	suggests,	urges	us	to	consider	our	own	moral	positioning:	“whether	we	recognize	it	or	not,	there	is	always	a	moral	positioning	in	the	objects	we	choose,	the	place	we	occupy	in	the	field,	the	way	we	interpret	facts,	the	form	of	writing	we	elaborate”	(Fassin	2012:	5).					Despite	moral	anthropology’s	disavowal	of	normative	moral	positions,	there	is	an	implicit	normative	moral	position	being	taken	here.		In	other	words,	its	assertion	
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there	is	a	moral	positioning	in	our	objects	of	study	that	needs	to	be	reflexively	considered	is	itself	a	normative	moral	position.		Thus,	moral	anthropology	seems	to	slide	into	exactly	the	sort	of	moral	discourse	it	interrogates;	it	too	is	“enunciated	a	priori	(it	knows	where	good	and	evil	are	located)	on	the	basis	of	intangible	principles:	it	does	not	need	ethnographic	validation”	(Fassin	2008:	339,	emphasis	added).		In	essence,	doesn’t	this	perspective	assume	the	very	thing	it	aims	to	study?		Just	to	be	clear,	I’m	not	asserting	that	our	work	is	‘neutral’,	‘objective’	or	a	‘view	from	nowhere’—assumptions	that	were	decisively	shattered	with	the	postmodern	turn	(which	moral	anthropology	is	arguably	the	latest	incarnation	of).		But	I’m	far	from	convinced	that	the	‘values’	that	drive	it	are	a	priori	moral	ones.			Let	me	turn	to	an	example	Fassin	himself	provides	to	illustrate	my	point.ii		Fassin	(2012)	argues	that	until	twenty	or	thirty	years	ago,	topics	such	as	violence,	suffering,	trauma,	humanitarianism	and	human	rights	received	little	attention	from	anthropologists.	This	“remarkable	evolution”,	he	suggests,	has	frequently	been	accompanied	by	a	more	engaged	positioning,	raising	the	question	of	why	we	were	so	obli.	Such	a	remarkable	evolution	raises	the	question	of	why	we	were	unaware	of	or	indifferent	to	the	tragic	of	the	world	before	and,	symmetrically,	why	we	became	so	passionately	involved	in	it	in	recent	years	(Fassin	2012:	5).		Instead,	“kinship	or	myths,	witchcraft	or	rituals,	peasantry	or	development”	(p.	5)	were	the	primary	objects	of	our	gaze.	Characterizing	this	Today,	however,	,	were	seen	as	more	relevant	for	the	understanding	of	human	societies.		This	transformation	of	our	gaze	and	of	our	lexicon		Fassin	doesn’t	attempt	to	explain	the	reasons	for	this	transformation	in	the	anthropological	gaze,	although	it’s	clear	that	he	sees	it	driven	to	some	extent	by	“moral	indignation”	(2008:	337)	and	the	emergence	of	a	moral	hierarchy	of	legitimate	objects	of	study	that	increasingly	dictates	what	we	study	and	how	(Caduff	2011).		But	there	are	other	ways	this	‘evolution’	might	be	read.		As	Bruce	Kapferer	notes,	“the	major	problem	with	some	views	concerning	new	developments	in	anthropology	and	cognate	disciplines	is	a	failure	to	examine	them	against	processes	occurring	in	the	wider	global	political	scene”	(2000:	175).		More	recently,	Kapferer	has	highlighted	the	“intense	pressure”	anthropology	faces	“by	governments	and	business	to	be	pragmatically	relevant”	(2012:	815)—surely	this,	as	much	as	anything,	explains	anthropology’s	growing	preoccupation	with	social	‘problems’.		To	echo	Wiktor	Stoczkowski’s	(2008:	349)	observation,	even	the	overtly	morally	committed	anthropologist	“does	not	cease	to	be	a	homo	economicus	academicus”.				Writing	in	1997,	Simon	Marginson	highlighted	the	rise	of	what	he	termed	the	‘managed	university’	and	the	ways	in	which	institutional	autonomy	and	academic	freedom	were	being	fundamentally	reworked.		I	suspect	that	the	shift	in	topics	Fassin	highlights	over	the	past	two	or	three	decades	maps	quite	neatly	onto	these	transformations	in	the	academy	that	anthropologists	have	elsewhere	explored	under	the	guise	of	audit	culture	(e.g.,	Strathern	2000;	Shore	2008)	and	the	rise	of	the	neoliberal	academy	(e.g.,	Shore	2010).		For	example,	in	Canada,	where	I	resided	for	more	than	a	decade,	academics	are	expected	to	focus	on	research	that	
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contributes	in	a	direct	way	to	solving	social,	economic	and	cultural	challenges	and	problems	(Dehli	and	Taylor	2006).		Thus,	the	anthropologist	studying	“violence	and	suffering,	trauma	and	mourning,	prisons	and	camps”—especially	if	her	research	promises	to	produce	the	holy	trinity	of	‘impact’,	‘relevance’	and	‘significance’—stands	a	far	better	chance	of	obtaining	funding	(on	which	academic	tenure	increasingly	depends)	than	the	one	studying	“kinship	or	myths,	witchcraft	or	rituals”.		The	decision	to	pursue	these	topics	is	as	much	a	matter	of	livelihood	as	morality,	even	if	framed	in	moral	terms.iii				In	sum,	moral	anthropology	aims	to	introduce	new	objects	of	study	whilst	respecting	(and	protecting)	the	epistemological	grounds	of	our	work—opening	up	the	“black	box”	(Fassin	2008:	338)	of	our	own	moralities	and	those	we	study.		But	by	prefiguring	‘the	moral’	as	the	primary	grounds	of	our	engagements,	I	can’t	help	feel	that	one	black	box	is	being	replaced	with	another.					
Notes	i.			 Although	there	are	differences	in	anthropologists’	individual	positions,	I	treat	the	‘anthropology	of	ethics’	and	‘moral	anthropology’	as	largely	synonymous	(although	I	tend	to	use	the	anthropologists’	own	designation	when	talking	about	their	work).		I	think	this	is	justified	by	the	fact	that	there	are	common	strands	in	their	vision	and	arguments,	despite	the	evident	contrasts.	ii.		 See	Bastin	this	volume	for	a	more	in-depth	critique	of	Fassin’s	arguments.	iii.		To	such	observations	Fassin	might	well	respond	that	this	is	precisely	the	sort	of	thing	moral	anthropology	seeks	to	uncover!		After	all,	moral	anthropology	is	not	only	concerned	with	how	moral	questions	are	posed	and	addressed	but	“how	nonmoral	questions	are	rephrased	as	moral”	(Fassin	2008:	4).		But	I	suspect	this	says	more	about	the	colonizing	tendencies	of	the	‘morals-as-values’	frame	than	it	does	about	the	nature	of	the	phenomenon	in	question.			
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